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David A. Wise 
During the past two decades the labor market participation of older work- 
ers has fallen dramatically. During this same period private pension cover- 
age has been rapidly extended and social security benefits have been in- 
creased. While the observation that these two trends occurred over the 
same period of time does not mean that one caused the other, it does high- 
light the possibility that the two may be related. Motivated in part by these 
trends, the National Bureau  of  Economic  Research  has  undertaken a 
study of the labor market aspects of pension plans as part of a larger proj- 
ect on pensions in the American economy. For the past two years, econo- 
mists at several universities have been engaged in analyzing the nature of 
private pension  plans and their  potential  incentive effects in the labor 
market. This volume represents the results of their work. 
This overview is intended to introduce the reader to the subject, to mo- 
tivate the work that follows, and to provide a distillation of  the major 
findings of  the volume.  Trends  in pension  coverage  and concomitant 
trends in labor force participation  of older workers are discussed first. 
This serves as a background for our work and helps to motivate the issues 
that are addressed in the volume. Then the characteristics of the common 
defined benefit pension plans are described, emphasizing those attributes 
that are likely to affect labor force behavior. The intent is to demonstrate 
the order of magnitude of the potential  incentive effects of these plans 
without attempting to  present empirical estimates of the impacts, but sug- 
gesting that the response of  workers to pension plan characteristics could 
be substantial. To introduce the reader to the subject, the discussion and 
illustrations in this section also emphasize the possible relationship  be- 
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tween pensions and retirement, while the volume papers cover a much 
wider range of empirical and theoretical issues. The next two sections re- 
view the broad range of  the volume's empirical findings and theoretical 
conclusions regarding the impact of  pension plans on the labor force, 
using the first section as background. 
1.1  Trends in Pension Coverage and in Labor Force Participation 
The rapid growth in pension coverage over the past three decades is 
documented in figure  1.1. (The material in this section is taken largely 
from Ellwood, in this volume.) Approximately 50% of  the work force 
now has some form of pension coverage.  Perhaps more significant, the 
rapid increase in pension coverage has been accompanied by a striking in- 
crease in the number of retired persons who collect some pension income, 
as documented in figure 1.2 (Ellwood, in this vol.).  Pension coverage in 
the government sector is now nearly complete, but a large portion of the 
private sector still remains uncovered after rapid growth and coverage 
during the 1950s and somewhat slower growth and coverage thereafter 
(Ellwood, in this vol.). 
With large portions of the private sector still uncovered, who is covered 
and who is not? What are the correlates of private sector coverage? First, 
there is  a  striking relationship between  private pension  coverage and 
union status. Nearly 80% of  all union members report that they are cov- 
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Fig. 1.1  Private and government pension coverage as a percentage of 
the civilian labor force (Ellwood, in this vol.). 3  Overview 
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Fig. 1.2  Pension  benefit recipients as a percentage of the civilian 
population 55 + (Source: Kotlikoff  and Smith, 1983). 
ered by a pension plan, while only about one-third of  all nonunion work- 
ers report such coverage. The relationship between pension coverage and 
union status is evident in all major industrial categories. Pension coverage 
is also much more common in large firms than in small ones. And in estab- 
lishments in all size groups, coverage of union members is more common 
than coverage of those not in unions (Ellwood, in this vol.). In short, the 
descriptive evidence suggests that union status and firm size are perhaps 
the two most prominent determinants of pension coverage. 
In addition, the older, the more educated, and the wealthier are more 
likely to be covered by a pension plan. Nonwhite workers, on the other 
hand, seem just as likely to be covered as whites. A pattern emerges: work- 
ers who gain lesser rewards in the labor market typically are less likely to 
have pension plans. Thus it appears that pensions do  little to counterbal- 
ance differences among groups in wage earnings (Ellwood, in this vol.). In 
summary, pension coverage appears to go hand in hand with union repre- 
sentation, large establishment size, and other economic compensation in 
the labor market. 
While pension coverage was increasing, there was at the same time a 
striking decline in the labor force participation rate of older workers. For 
example, between 1960 and 1980, the labor force participation rate for 
men aged 55-65  fell from 87Vo to 72%. For those over 65, the rate fell 
from 35%  to below 20% (Ellwood, in this vol.). More detailed evidence 
for the 1970s is shown in table 1.1. In particular, labor force participation 4  David A. Wise 
Table 1.1  Labor Force Participation Rates of Men 60 and Older, 1969-79 



















Source:  Selected issues of Employment and Earnings, table A-4. 
fell from close to 76% in 1969 to 61% in 1979. Over the same period the 
rates for men 65 and older fell from 27% to 20% (Hausman and Wise, in 
this vol.). 
1.2  The Structure of  Pension Plans and Their Potential 
Incentive Effects 
Having in mind the increase in pension coverage in recent decades and 
the substantial decline in labor force participation, it is informative to ex- 
amine the provisions of pensions that might influence labor market be- 
havior. The goal here is not actually to estimate the impact that pensions 
have on the labor market but rather to give a rough idea of the magnitudes 
of the incentives created by pensions and to point to the impact that var- 
ious pension provisions have on these incentives. (The material in this sec- 
tion is taken largely from Kotlikoff and Wise, in this volume.) 
Three-quarters of all persons and nearly 85% of all union members par- 
ticipating in private pension plans are enrolled in defined benefit  plans 
where benefits are determined according to a specified formula. The re- 
mainder are enrolled in plans where benefits are directly related to contri- 
butions made on behalf of (and by) the employee and to the performance 
of the plan’s investment portfolio.  Virtually all government pensions are 
defined benefit plans. Because most workers are covered by defined bene- 
fit plans and because these plans are likely to have the most important ef- 
fects on labor market incentives, the following remarks are confined to 
this type of plan. 
Defined benefit  formulas often are quite complex. Benefits are typi- 
cally determined by years of service times wages in the last years of  em- 
ployment times a percentage figure (typically 1  %-2%). In addition, plans 
typically have vesting provisions and many are integrated with social secu- 
rity.  Early retirement  provisions  also are an important aspect  of most 
plans. Because of the many plan variations and the complex details of the 
formulas, it is easiest to understand the potential incentive effects of the 5  Overview 
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plans by considering pension accrual rates implied by a typical plan (Kot- 
likoff and Wise, in this vol.). 
Consider first a worker who at age 30 begins participating in a defined 
benefit plan with the following characteristics: the plan calculates normal 
retirement benefits as 1% of average earnings over the last five years of 
service times years of service. Benefits are reduced by 3% for each year 
that early retirement precedes normal retirement.  “Cliff vesting” occurs 
after 10 years; the worker is entitled before this time to no benefits and at 
10 years to all benefits that accrue according to the formula described 
above. The early and normal retirement ages are 55 and 65, respectively. 
For a typical worker, I shall describe the annual increment to pension 
wealth as a percentage of the wage rate. Underlying the calculations is a 
representative  lifetime  age-earnings  profile  that  assumes  substantial 
growth in real wage rates between ages 30 and 50 and very little growth 
from 50 to 65. Consider first the pension accrual patterns for this plan if 
wage inflation is 6%  and the nominal interest rate is 9%  (3% real). The 
accrual pattern is shown in the top line of figure 1.3. (Kotlikoff and Wise, 
in this vol.). The other lines on the graph show the accrual profiles under 
different interest rate assumptions. 
Three aspects of the accrual profiles need to be understood. First, there 
is no pension accrual before the year of vesting, and in the year of vesting 
there is an increase in pension wealth that varies from approximately 4% 
to 14% of wage earnings in that year depending on the interest rate. Sec- 
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ond, the rate of  accrual increases slowly at first and then rather sharply 
until the age of early retirement. Thus pension wealth tends to  be accrued 
during the later years of one’s working life. Third, at the age of early re- 
tirement there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate, and the rate falls there- 
after. The drop occurs because the early retirement reduction is less than 
an actuarially consistent reduction would be. That is, annual benefits are 
not reduced enough to offset the increase in the number of years that one 
will receive benefits if one retires early. In this case, two competing forces 
are determining accrual rates after age 55. On the one hand, benefits in- 
crease due to increases in wage rates with age and because of  additional 
years of service. On the other hand, the worker gives up the option of tak- 
ing benefits that are actuarially advantageous. After age 55,  the rate of ac- 
crual continues to decline. Finally, note that the accrual pattern is substan- 
tially affected by the nominal interest rate. It is clear that the accrual due 
to vesting is affected by interest rates, but it can also be seen that if interest 
rates are high relative to the rate of inflation, then the accrual after age 55 
can indeed be negative. In this case pension wealth could actually decline 
with additional years of  work. 
It is useful now to contrast a plan with an early retirement option with a 
plan that has no early retirement option or that uses an actuarially fair 
early retirement reduction formula. The difference is shown in figure 1.4 
(Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). Notice that without the early retirement 
option, benefits continue to increase to age 65. Indeed, in this case the 
251  20 
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Fig. 1.4  Pension increments as a percentage of salary, by age, for plans 
with an early retirement option versus retirement at 65, 
assuming 6%  wage inflation and a 3% real interest rate 
(Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). 7  Overview 
pension accrual rate is very much tilted toward the later years of a person’s 
working career. 
It should be clear from these graphs that the defined benefit formula 
seems to provide an increasing incentive to  work at least to the age of early 
retirement. After this the incentive provided by the pension formula de- 
clines substantially. To the extent that retirement benefits provide an in- 
centive to continue working, it is also clear that the incentive is  much 
greater without the early retirement option than with it. 
It is important to emphasize the impact of  the interest rate on pension 
accruals. Suppose, for example, the graph in figure 1.4 were reproduced, 
assuming zero wage inflation and a 10% interest rate. Under these as- 
sumptions the pension accrual rate after the age of early retirement would 
indeed be negative. If a person worked an additional year, pension wealth 
would actually be lost at a rate approaching 15% of wage earnings at age 
65 (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). While these assumptions are prob- 
ably unrealistic, they demonstrate an important point. 
Wage inflation is also important. While the general pattern of pension 
wealth accrual is not greatly altered by wage inflation, the increment to 
pension wealth at the time of vesting is very greatly affected by inflation. 
For example, with 2% wage inflation and a 5%  interest rate, the incre- 
ment to pension wealth in the year of  vesting would be over 35%  of the 
wage rate in that year. On the other hand, with 10% wage inflation and a 
13% interest rate, the increment at the time of  vesting would be only 
about 5%  (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). Thus, while it is sometimes 
argued that vesting is not an important determinant of labor market be- 
havior, it can be seen that the effect is likely to vary substantially with 
wage inflation. 
Finally, in the majority of plans, pension accrual ceases once normal re- 
tirement age is reached. In many other plans, there are limits on addition- 
al accrual. Almost no plans make provisions for actuarial increases to 
compensate for the fact that late retirees will collect benefits over a shorter 
period. Typically, continued work after the normal age of retirement in- 
volves a substantial loss in pension wealth. Thus pensions typically pro- 
vide a strong disincentive to work after the age of normal retirement. 
What is the effect of pensions on job change? Figure 1.5 illustrates the 
cost in pension wealth of job change (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). 
The graph, for ease of exposition, assumes no early retirement option. 
The figure shows accrual rate profiles for workers joining the pension 
plan at ages 30, 40, and 50. The figure is constructed under the assump- 
tion that workers of the same age receive identical wage compensation, re- 
gardless of job change. Thus the diagram indicates the potential loss in ac- 
crued pension benefits for workers who switch jobs but receive the same 
wage compensation in the new job and are covered by the same pension 
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Fig.  1.5  Pension increments as a percentage of  salary, by  age, for an 
employee beginning work  at 31, 41, 51, with no early 
retirement option, assuming 6%  wage inflation and a 3% 
interest rate (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). 
starts work at age 30 and does not change jobs thereafter (with 6%  wage 
inflation and a 3% real interest rate). A person with one job change would 
accumulate benefits  up to age 41  according to the top curve but then 
would accumulate benefits according to the curve labeled age 41.  Note 
that no benefits would be accumulated for the first 10 years. The differ- 
ence in accumulated pension benefits at age 65 reflects the difference in 
the areas under the two accrual paths. This difference could be very sub- 
stantial and depends, of course, both on when job changes occur and how 
frequently they occur. It is important to note that the loss in this example 
is not due primarily to vesting. It results from the characteristics of many 
defined benefit plans that, in effect, index pension accumulation  to in- 
creases in earnings. This indexation is uncoupled when a job change oc- 
curs. If the person were to  change jobs at age 51, the loss would be greater. 
The loss would be greater still if the person were to change jobs twice, say 
at age 41 and then again at age 5 1. Individual pension accrual patterns 
with job change would of course depend on whether the worker becomes 
vested  in earlier  plans,  but because of their  relationship  to final wage 
rates, benefits from the last plan are typically much more important than 
those from earlier plans. 
This graph also shows that, even under moderate wage inflation and in- 
terest  rate assumptions, vesting can be a 'very important component  of 
compensation.  For a worker hired at age 51, the increment  in pension 
wealth in the year of vesting amounts to 40% of salary in that year. 9  Overview 
In short, in inflationary times the benefit provisions  of  most defined 
benefit pension plans are in fact powerful deterrents to job switching even 
for the young and even if the alternative job offers identical wages and 
provides an identical pension plan. Thus the benefit provisions of  defined 
benefit formulas not only serve as a strong deterrent to retirement prior to 
the early retirement age, they serve as a remarkably strong deterrent to  job 
switching, even at very young ages. In addition, it appears that pension 
plans tend to encourage retirement  after the age of early retirement and 
provide a very strong incentive to retire at the age of normal retirement. 
Whether such effects are intended or whether workers recognize them is 
yet another question. 
We have examined the characteristics of a typical defined benefit plan. 
But what can one say about the average incentive effects implicit in the 
wide range of  stipulations among actual plans? The accrual profiles im- 
plied by a very large number of plans described in the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Level of Benefits Survey look on average much like the hypo- 
thetical plans described above (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). The anal- 
ysis of actual plans suggests that vesting may provide an  important incen- 
tive for staying with a firm and that pension wealth accruals provide an 
important incentive for remaining until the age of early retirement. After 
this age the incentive for continued work provided by typical pension ac- 
cruals declines rapidly. And it should be kept in mind that after age 65 the 
average accrual rate would indeed be negative, certainly encouraging re- 
tirement. It is also found, based on the analysis of actual pension plans, 
that job change can reduce pension benefits substantially. For example, 
consider accrued benefits at age 65 for persons hired at age 3 1, 41, or  5 1. 
Assume in addition that a person does not become vested in another plan 
prior to  joining the firm. Based on the analysis of 700  plans and estimated 
wage profiles-and  assuming 6% wage inflation and a 9% interest rate- 
the average aggregate of benefits of persons hired at age 5 1 are only about 
50% of the benefits of those hired at 31. Persons hired at 41 would accu- 
mulate about 80% of the benefits of persons hired at 31. Benefits if hired 
at age 5 1 range from only 3 1070 of the benefits if hired at 3 1 in retail trade, 
to 78% in manufacturing.  The ratio among those hired at age 41 ranges 
from 65% in retail trade to 95% in transportation (Kotlikoff and Wise, in 
this vol.). 
Implications that may be drawn from the above discussion are based di- 
rectly on the structure of pension plans.  In addition to the incentive ef- 
fects of the plans, their structure also seems to provide substantial evi- 
dence for long-term  contract versus  spot market theories of  the labor 
market (Kotlikoff and Wise, in this vol.). The next section summarizes the 
volume’s more detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of pension 
coverage, the effects of pension on labor force participation,  and impor- 
tant implications of the unfunded nature of the Federal Civil Service Re- 10  David A. Wise 
tirement System. For convenience, papers that rely more heavily on a for- 
mal conceptual approach are summarized in the following section. The 
issues addressed include the use of  pensions to select certain types of 
workers and to encourage early retirement, the importance of heterogene- 
ity among workers in designing optimal plans, the incentive effects of par- 
ticular job characteristics, and pensions as insurance. Simulation results 
on the riskiness of pension plans are also discussed in the section. The ar- 
bitrariness of  the grouping, however, is revealed by the very substantial 
overlap in the issues addressed in the papers and their conclusions. 
1.3  The Determinants of Pension Coverage and the Impact of Pensions 
on Labor Force Participation 
The descriptive data above suggest a very substantial relationship be- 
tween union membership and pension coverage and also suggest that typi- 
cal defined benefit pension plans could have a potentially significant ef- 
fect on labor force participation. While these data only suggest possible 
cause and effect, more detailed analysis points to the existence of a causal 
relationship. 
Unions have a substantial effect on pension coverage, even after con- 
trolling for other determinants of coverage such as firm size, worker edu- 
cation, and the wage rate (Freeman, in this vol.).  Unions increase the 
probability that establishments or workers will have a pension plan by siz- 
able and statistically significant amounts, with estimates ranging from .17 
to .32. Given the existence of a plan, however, the effect of unions on con- 
tributions to the plan is not substantial. Although estimates vary widely, 
the evidence suggests that for a nonunion worker to have the same prob- 
ability of having a pension as a union worker, the wage rate of the non- 
union worker would have to be at least twice as high as the wage rate of the 
union worker, given like other characteristics. While establishment size is 
a key determinant of whether a nonunion worker has a pension plan, it 
has only a modest effect on whether a union worker has a pension plan. 
Not only do unions increase the allocation of funds to pensions, they 
affect the  provisions of  pensions as well. In particular,  union  pension 
plans are more likely to pay benefits on a flat rate dependent on years of 
service rather than on earnings.  It may be argued that paying flat rate 
benefits is the pension equivalent of  standard rate wage policies and re- 
flects the redistributive goal of unions as a political organization, At the 
same time, because pension benefits are based on years of  service, these 
plans tend to benefit older workers more than younger ones (Freeman, in 
this vol.). 
The evidence on the structure of pension plans presented above suggests 
that defined pension plans could have a very substantial effect on retire- 
ment behavior. Because available data do not allow one to associate par- 11  Overview 
ticular individuals with details of their pension plans, however, it is not 
possible to provide direct evidence on the effects of the characteristics of 
these plans on retirement. Reliable data that would reveal the potential in- 
teraction between wage rates and pension coverage, for example, have not 
been released. Pension coverage may not be exogenously determined. In 
addition, it is important to keep in mind that income after retirement is 
evidently the major reason for pensions, so if  they lead to earlier retire- 
ment this should not necessarily be interpreted as an undesirable result. It 
may, however, be in conflict with other goals of society such as extension 
of the working life with increases in longevity. Nonetheless, the varied evi- 
dence that is available suggests a very substantial effect of pension cover- 
age on the reduction in labor force participation of older workers. Sum- 
mary  data show that  the  proportion  of  preretirement  income  that  is 
replaced by pension benefits is considerably higher for those who retire 
younger than for those who retire at an older age. For example, among 
those who retire between 50 and 54, 27% of preretirement is replaced by 
pensions, while for those who retire after age 65, approximately 17% of 
preretirement  income is  replaced by  pension benefits (Ellwood, in this 
vol.). In general, those who retire later tend to have lower pension wealth 
(Taubman, in this vol.). The implication is that increased benefits may en- 
courage workers to retire earlier. On the other hand, persons who want to 
retire at an early age could simply arrange to acquire higher pension bene- 
fits to accommodate their retirement goals. The circumstantial evidence 
provided  by  more  detailed analyses, however,  suggests that this effect 
probably is not the major explanation. 
Compare, for example, the retirement behavior of federal civil service 
employees, who have very generous retirement benefits, with the retire- 
ment behavior of employees in the private sector. Over half of federal em- 
ployees retire before the age of 60, whereas the comparable figure for the 
private sector is only 7% (Leonard, in this vol.). This seems clearly related 
to the provisions of  the federal civil service retirement system. Consider 
the capitalized value of the pension received under the current federal civil 
service retirement system by an employee who joins the system at age 25 
and who receives typical longevity salary increases over his or her lifetime. 
Suppose that such an employee were to attain a nominal salary of $25,000 
at the age of 58. The value of pension entitlement for this illustrative em- 
ployee accumulates slowly across his working life, reaching by age 54 an 
amount equivalent to about $130,000, given on his or her sixty-fifth birth- 
day. The next year, when the employee qualifies for full retirement, the 
value jumps to the equivalent of $323,000. It stays at this level for a short 
time and then begins to fall, reaching $248,000  if the employee waits until 
age 65 before retiring (Leonard, in this vol.).  It is clear that federal em- 
ployees have a substantial, increasing incentive to work until they reach 
eligibility for full retirement. At this point, the equivalent of their entitle- 12  David A. Wise 
ment peaks; if they continue working it starts to fall. Indeed, this illustra- 
tive individual would lose $75,000 in pension benefits if he retired at 65 in- 
stead of 55. The discontinuity in the entitlement at age 55 comes from the 
shift in the entitlement's value as the employee crosses the combination of 
age and experience that allows early retirement. This may be a rather ex- 
treme case because the civil service pension system is much more generous 
than the typical private pension plan. Nonetheless, the effect seems clear 
and the direction of the effect is substantiated by other analyses. 
This very generous system is achieved only at very substantial cost and 
budget consequences. The unfunded liability of the federal civil service re- 
tirement system amounts to  approximately $500 billion, a net liability ap- 
proximately one-half the size of the current officially recognized national 
debt. Labor expenses recognized in the direct expenditures budget consid- 
ered by Congress would have to be about 22% higher than they currently 
are to account for full funding of  pension obligations occurred in each 
year. Thus a full accounting of pension obligations would imply consider- 
ably higher labor compensation for federal employees than is commonly 
recognized (Leonard, in this vol.). 
Among California teachers in public schools, and after controlling for 
other individual attributes that may be related to  retirement, the age of re- 
tirement shows that larger pension benefits are associated with earlier re- 
tirement. Analyzing a random sample of  California schoolteachers, both 
retired and still teaching, we find a standard deviation increase in pension 
wealth is associated with an  approximately one-year decrease in the age of 
retirement. ' 
If higher private pension benefits and provisions lead to earlier retire- 
ment, then one might suppose that greater social security benefits would 
also tend to encourage earlier retirement. The evidence on the effect of so- 
cial security benefits on the age of retirement is indeed consistent with the 
evidence on the effect of private pension plans on retirement. Analysis of 
data collected in the Retirement History Survey, that follows for 10 years 
persons aged 58-63  in 1969, verifies two hypotheses about the likely ef- 
fects of pension benefits (Hausman and Wise, in this vol.).  The first is 
that, other things equal, persons who can retire with larger benefits are 
more likely to leave the labor force than those who would receive smaller 
benefits if they were to retire. The second is that persons who by working 
another year could increase the discounted value of pension benefits that 
they would receive in the future are more likely to  continue working. Or, if 
working another year would reduce the present value of  future benefits, 
the individual is more likely to retire early. This loss is analogous to the 
typical loss in private pension benefits if one continues to work after the 
age of early retirement, as demonstrated in the graphs above. In short, 
analysis of  the Retirement History Survey shows both a strong effect of 
the increment in pension benefits on prolonging labor force participation 13  Overview 
and a strong effect of cumulated social security wealth on departure from 
the labor force. Indeed, the data suggest that a large proportion of the 
dramatic decrease in labor force participation of older workers between 
1969 and 1979 can be explained by the large increases in social security 
benefits over this period (Hausman and Wise, in this vol.). 
It can be argued, as mentioned above, that individuals choose jobs and 
associated pension plans, make savings decisions, and take account of ex- 
pected  social security benefits to provide retirement income consistent 
with preplanned desired age of  retirement.  In major part, however, this 
could not be said to be true of social security benefits, large portions of 
which must have been unexpected, in particular the very large increases in 
the early 1970s. Thus the relationship between social security benefits and 
age of retirement that is observed in the data must have been induced to a 
substantial degree by unexpected social security benefits and is not a re- 
flection of retirement decisions based on expected benefits. 
Indeed, further analysis of the Retirement History Survey shows that 
retirees in this sample would receive three to four times as much in bene- 
fits as they made in contributions (Hurd and Shoven, in this vol.). Possi- 
bly more surprising, the wealthy received the largest transfers in absolute 
amounts, and in many cases they even received the highest rates of return 
on social security contributions (Hurd and Shoven, in this vol.). 
The description of pension plan provisions presented above also sug- 
gested that, at least through the age of early retirement, pensions should 
tend to reduce job change. Although to date we have not undertaken de- 
tailed analyses of the effect of pension plan provisions on job change- 
again due to limitations of data available to us-summary  data suggest 
that pension provisions do reduce job turnover.  For example, whereas 
73% of all workers aged 51-55 without pensions have less than 10 years’ 
tenure, only about 33% of workers with pensions have been with their em- 
ployer for less than a decade (Ellwood, in this vol.). The direction of this 
relationship holds for every age group. Of course, such data prove noth- 
ing. There is a host of possible explanations for these differences, some of 
which are emphasized in conceptual work referred to below. Still, the data 
do suggest that pensions may in fact have sizable impacts on job change. 
1.4  More Formal Conceptual Results 
Conceptual analyses of the effects of pension plans in general reinforce 
the implications suggested by the structure of the plans described above. 
In addition, these analyses provide insights that are not so readily discern- 
ible based on the structure of the plans. 
Analysis of accrued benefits based on plan provisions presented above 
shows that job change is likely to be associated with a substantial cost in 
loss of pension benefits. Descriptive data mentioned above also show that 14  David A. Wise 
turnover or job change among employees covered by pensions is much 
less than among those who are not covered. Consistent with this observa- 
tion, theoretical analysis demonstrates that pensions can be important in 
reducing turnover among workers who are attracted to the firm (Viscusi, 
in this vol.).  But, in the face of worker uncertainty about future job per- 
formance and turnover costs, pensions can also be important in self-se- 
lecting more stable employees.  (Viscusi, in this vol.).  This suggests, of 
course, that observed relationships between pension coverage and job  tur- 
nover are likely to result at least in part from self-selection, by workers 
who would like to avoid job change, of firms with appropriate pension 
plans. 
The structure of pension plans also suggests that most plans tend to en- 
courage retirement after some age, in many instances after the age of early 
retirement and in almost all cases after the age of normal retirement. It is 
difficult to make contracts that commit workers to retire at a certain age, 
and it may be institutionally impractical to reduce wages commensurate 
with the reduction in productivity of older workers. It can be demonstrat- 
ed, however, that pensions may be used to help induce appropriate retire- 
ment behavior, consistent with economic efficiency (Nalebuff and Zeck- 
hauser,  in  this  vol.).  In addition,  work  heterogeneity  has  important 
implications for the design and effects of pension plans. In particular, het- 
erogeneity among workers implies that the concept of  actuarial fairness is 
illusive and much more ambiguous than is commonly recognized (Nale- 
buff and Zeckhauser, in this vol.).  As demonstrated above, most defined 
benefit plans are apparently actuarially unfair to those who prolong their 
working lives. However, if workers can estimate their life span, those who 
expect to live longer may choose to retire later and the apparent pattern of 
actuarial benefits may be reversed. For example, a person who expects to 
live five more years may find that the increase in pension  benefits that 
would be gained by working another year is not large enough to offset the 
reduction of one year in the number of years that benefits would be re- 
ceived. On the other hand, a person who expects to  live 10 more years and 
thus would receive the incremental benefits over a longer period of time 
may find that it is worthwhile to prolong labor force participation for an 
additional year. The structure of a pension plan that is optimal for an  indi- 
vidual, that is, one that maximizes ex ante expected utility, however, must 
make it actuarially unfavorable for the individual to retire later than some 
age (Nalebuff and Zeckhauser, in this vol.). 
We know, of course, that typical pension plans cover large numbers of 
workers that may be dissimilar in many respects, in particular with respect 
to life expectancy.  Some proposed  pension  reform proposals would in- 
deed impose more similar plans on even more heterogeneous groups of 
workers. In a first-best situation, however, a separate pension plan would 15  Overview 
be designed for each homogeneous group of workers. The imposition of 
the same plan on nonhomogeneous groups of workers may be shown to 
work to  the possible detriment of each of the groups. That is, it could turn 
out that under the common plan no  group is better off than under the plan 
tailored to its particular characteristics (Nalebuff and Zeckhauser, in this 
vol.). 
Given existing compensation arrangements, heterogeneity among indi- 
viduals may in general have an important impact on the compensation 
that individual workers receive. A variety of  economic models of compen- 
sation suggest that firms should allow workers to choose individually how 
they would like to have their compensation divided between wages and 
benefits. More compensation in the form of  retirement benefits or health 
insurance benefits  would  be offset by reduced  wage rates.  In this case, 
there would be no reason for firms to try to attract certain types of  work- 
ers. In practice, however, even among equally productive workers wages 
and benefits will not necessarily  balance (Bulow and Landsman, in this 
vol.). Workers may, for example, receive the same wage rather than the 
same total compensation.  Nonetheless,  for labor as a whole, increases in 
aggregate benefits would  be offset by decreases in wage compensation. 
Under these circumstances,  firms that offer particular  types of benefits 
should expect to attract workers likely to take advantage of these benefits. 
An important implication of this possibility is that we can say only a lim- 
ited amount about the aggregate firm worker implicit labor contract by 
looking at individual compensation  profiles  (Bulow  and Landsman, in 
this vol.). 
It should be clear that defined  benefit pension  plans have potentially 
large incentive effects on labor participation. Whether they are efficient 
or not is another question.  If the pension rule is taken to be exogenous, 
then many provisions of defined benefit plans are shown to have adverse 
incentive effects. For example, a large number of plans incorporate a 10- 
year cliff vesting provision, but complete and immediate vesting would be 
a  necessary  condition for fully efficient pension  plans  (Lazear,  in this 
vol.). On the other hand, defined contribution pIans, in contrast to de- 
fined  benefit  plans,  always  induce  an efficient allocation  of  resources 
(Lazear, in this vol.). 
An alternative to the analysis of  the incentive effects of exogeneously 
given pension plans is to consider the form that private pensions are likely 
to take when employers provide pensions-in  contrast to an optimally 
formulated government pension policy, for example. In particular, work- 
ers may like to have insurance against many work-related contingencies: 
disability, future productivity,  change in employment. Because these un- 
certainties are hard to verify, however, they cannot be the object of insur- 
ance directly. A worker may thus want to allocate some part of his current 16  David A. Wise 
compensation to provide income in situations in which the income will be 
more important to him, and thus pensions may serve as insurance (Dia- 
mond and Mirrlees, in this vol.). 
Finally, uncertainty about receipt of  future pension benefits is an im- 
portarlt aspect of the equivalent compensation value of the plans. This, of 
course, is not an attribute of plans that can be gleaned from the structure 
of the plans as described above. Several economically relevant events dur- 
ing  a  worker’s  lifetime,  both  macroeconomic  events  and  individual- 
specific ones, are likely to affect the value of pension benefits actually re- 
ceived.  Through  simulation  analysis,  it  is  possible  to  compare  the 
riskiness of alternative forms of  defined benefit pension plans (Green, in 
this vol.). Results based on this methodology show that among four forms 
of defined benefit plan, a plan based on a percentage of final salary is least 
risky when compared to a plan that bases benefits on the highest 10 years 
of salary, a plan based on the worker’s career average salary, and one that 
determines benefits by years of service only. It may be argued that the ex- 
tent to which pension plans are risky has important implications for the 
effect of pension plans on other forms of individual saving (Green, in this 
vol.). The certainty equivalent value of a pension to the worker is likely to 
be much less than the value of the liability it represents to the firm. This is 
because part of the variance in pension wealth viewed by the worker is due 
to individual-specific risk that from the point of view of the firm is aver- 
aged out over many workers. Therefore it may be argued that pensions de- 
crease the value of other forms of savings by workers by less than the in- 
crease  in  required  saving  by  firms  necessary  to  offset  their  pension 
liabilities. Thus the riskiness of private pensions may have substantial im- 
portance in studying the effect of private pensions on aggregate savings in 
the national economy (Green, in this vol.). 
1.5  Conclusions 
Over the past three decades pension coverage has expanded substantial- 
ly; over the latter part of this period there has been a very dramatic reduc- 
tion in the labor force participation of older workers. The typical defined 
benefit pension plan provides an increasing incentive for an employee to 
remain with the same firm until the age of early retirement; after that the 
structure of the typical plan provides less incentive to work, and indeed 
the stipulations of many plans imply actual losses in pension wealth ac- 
crual after the age of early retirement. After the age of normal retirement, 
almost all plans incorporate loss in pension wealth if the employee contin- 
ues to work. Thus the structure of pension plans alone suggests that the in- 
crease in pension coverage may have had a good deal to do with the de- 
cline in the labor force participation rate of older workers. More detailed 
analysis of the relationship between pension coverage and age of retire- 17  Overview 
ment appears to confirm this possibility.  In addition, empirical analysis 
suggests that the increases in social security benefits have played a sub- 
stantial role in the decline in the labor force participation of older work- 
ers. 
In addition to providing  an incentive for older workers to retire, the 
typical structure of  defined benefit pension  plans imposes a substantial 
cost in pension wealth on workers who change jobs. The order of  magni- 
tude of these losses may not be widely appreciated, but the evidence avail- 
able suggests that pension coverage reduces job change. 
More formal analysis of pensions reinforces the apparent implications 
that can be drawn from the structure of the plans themselves.  In particu- 
lar, the use of compensation in the form of pension coverage can provide a 
mechanism  for encouraging  older workers  to retire when  institutional 
constraints may prevent employers from reducing the wage earnings of 
older workers in accordance with reductions in labor productivity. Theo- 
retical analysis also demonstrates that pensions can be used to  select more 
stable employees and to discourage job changing among those hired. In 
addition, conceptual analysis highlights the importance of heterogeneity 
among  employees,  suggesting that policies  that encourage  uniformity 
among pension plans may not necessarily increase the general welfare of 
employees. 
Notes 
1. These findings are from Steven I. Kutner, “Individual Attributes and Pension Accep- 
tance Decisions: A Case Study.” Although presented at the conference, the final version of 
the paper was not finished in time for inclusion in this volume. 
2. This point is emphasized by Hurd and Boskin (1981). 
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